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Bates v. Lee
308 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 2002)
I. Facts
In the early morning of August 12, 1990, Joseph Earl Bates ("Bates")
kidnapped and killed Charles Edwin Jenkins ("Jenkins'.' On the evening of
August 11, Bates went to a night club with Gary Shaver ("Shaver'). 2 Jenkins
asked Bates and Shaver for a ride home from the club at approximately 2:00 a.m.
3
Bates stopped his truck twice during the ride, and during the second stop he hit
Jenkins three times on the back of the head with a shovel.4 When Jenkins
regained consciousness, Bates hit him again and hog-tied him in the back of his
truck.'
Several weeks earlier, an unknown individual had fired shots into Bates's
home.6 As a result, Bates set up a temporary campsite on the property of Hal
Eddleman ("Eddleman"), Bates's employer.7 Bates stopped at Eddleman's house
on the way to his campsite, told Eddleman that "he 'got one of the MF's' " and
asked him and another friend if they wanted to "watch or help."8 Bates then
took Jenkins to his campsite and questioned him regarding the identity of the
person who shot at his home.' Bates found Jenkins's answers unsatisfactory and
tied Jenkins to a tree.0 Bates put a gun to Jenkins's throat, but Jenkins main-
tained that he was not sure who fired the shots." Bates then untied Jenkins and
shot him in the throat in the back of his truck." After consulting with Eddleman
about the best way to dispose of the body, Bates threw Jenkins's body into the
Yadkin River." Afterward, Bates told a friend that he had to klUJenkins and that
it did not matter because he would get the same amount of time for murder as
1. Bates v. Lee, 308 F.3d 411,415-16 (4th Cir. 2002).
2. Id. at 415.
3. Id. at 416.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 415.
7. Bates, 308 F.3d at 415.





13. Bates, 308 F.3d at 416.
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for kidnapping. 4 Bates gave police a thirteen page confession in which he
confessed to beating, kidnapping, and shootingJenkins. 5 He stated that he killed
Jenkins because Jenkins would not tell him who had shot at his house and
because Jenkins spit on him. 6
Bates was found guilty of first degree murder and first degree kidnapping.
He received a death sentence for the first degree murder conviction. The
Supreme Court of North Carolina granted Bates a new trial. A second jury
convicted Bates of first degree murder and kidnapping based on both the felony
murder rule and premeditation and deliberation. The trial judge accepted the
jury's recommendation of a death sentence for the first degree murder conviction
and also sentenced Bates to forty years for the kidnapping conviction. The jury
based its recommendation of death on the "kidnapping and the especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel nature of the crime."' 7
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed Bates's
second conviction and sentence and the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari.'" The North Carolina Superior Court denied Bates's Motion for
Appropriate Relief. 9 The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed.2' The
United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina denied
Bates's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.2' The district court found no
substantial issue and declined to issue Bates a certificate of appealability.22 In its
decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit appeared to
be reviewing Bates's claims on the merits; the court did not discuss its grant of
a certificate of appealability.23
14. Id. at 419-20.
15. Id. at 415.
16. Id. at 416.
17. Id. at 416-17; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(9) (2001) (stating that a capital felony
that is "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" can be considered an aggravating circumstance).
18. State v. Bates, 473 S.E.2d 269 (N.C. 1996) (affirming second conviction and sentence
of death); Bates v. North Carolina, 519 U.S. 1131 (1997) (mem.) (denying certiorari).
19. Bates, 308 F.3d at 417.
20. Id.
21. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) (setting forth evidentiary requirements for writ of habeas
corpus; part of AEDPA).
22. Bates, 308 F.3d at 417. Under § 2253, Bates was required to seek a certificate of
appealability before appealing the district court's denial of habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (2000)
(requiring a judge to grant a certificate of appealability before an appeal may be taken to the court
of appeals).
23. In his concurring opinion in Miller-El v. Cockrel, Justice Scalia noted Bates as a case that
proceeded flatly in contravention of § 2253 because it was considered on the merits even though
a certificate of appealability never had issued. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 1029,1046 n.* (2003)
(Scalia, J., concurring). Section 2254 applies when the court of appeals reviews a claim for which
the district court granted a certificate of appealability. See § 2254. However, when a court reviews
a denial of a certificate of appealability, it considers whether the applicant has "made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right." § 2253. For more information about Milkr-El, see
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In his appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
Bates argued that the Supreme Court of North Carolina unreasonably applied
clearly established federal law by denying his claims on appeal.2 4 First, Bates
argued that the jury should have been instructed on the lesser included offense
of second degree murder.' Second, Bates contended that his Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendment due process rights were violated by the prosecutor's closing
arguments at the penalty phase.26 Finally, Bates argued that the "especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad. 7
II. Holding
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Bates's petition
for habeas relief and held that the Supreme Court of North Carolina did not
unreasonably apply clearly established Supreme Court precedent by rejecting
Bates's appeal.' The Fourth Circuit found: (1) the trial court did not err by
refusing to give a second degree murder instruction;2' and (2) the prosecutor's




A. Jugy Instruction on Second Degree Murder
Bates argued that the trial court should have given the jury a second degree
murder instruction because enough evidence existed to negate the deliberation
necessary for a first degree murder charge.3' He alleged that the trial court's
failure to give a second degree instruction constituted a due process violation.
32
Under Hopper v. Evans33 and Beck v. Alabama,' a court must give an instruction
Priya Nath, Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF.J. 407 (2003) (analyzing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 1029
(2003)).
24. Bates, 308 F.3d at 417-18.
25. Id. at 417.
26. Id. at 417-18.
27. Id. The Fourth Circuit rejected Bates's claim that the "especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel" aggravating circumstance instruction was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The court
concluded that the North Carolina jury instruction did not violate any of Bates's constitutional
rights. Id. at 424.
28. Id. at 415, 417.
29. Id. at 420.
30. Bates, 308 F.3d at 421-23.
31. Id. at 418.
32. Id.
33. 456 U.S. 605 (1982).
34. 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
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on a lesser included offense when the evidence warrants such an instruction.
35
The Fourth Circuit noted that the only "question here [was] whether the North
Carolina courts' finding that there was insufficient evidence to support a second
degree murder instruction was so wrong as to amount to a fundamental miscar-
riage of justice."36
Bates argued that due to circumstances in his life at the time of the murder
he was "distressed and thus unable to form the mental state to commit first
degree murder."37 He also claimed that his statement thatJenkins spit at him and
angered him, in combination with his personal circumstances, effectively negated
deliberation.3 ' The Fourth Circuit noted that," '[t]he decision of whether there
is enough evidence to justify a lesser included offense charge rests within the
sound discretion of the trial judge.' ,3
North Carolina courts consider a list of factors when analyzing whether
premeditation and deliberation existed at the time of the offense.4" This list
includes "provocation by the deceased" and "the defendant's conduct and
statements before and after the killing."41 As to provocation, the court noted
that before Jenkins cursed at and spit on Bates, Bates had kidnapped and beaten
Jenkins.42 In addition, the court found that Bates's statements before and after
kidnapping Jenkins supported the existence of premeditation and deliberation.
4 3
North Carolina law requires evidence of more than mere anger for a court to give
a second degree murder instruction.' It requires " 'evidence [that] would permit
a reasonable finding that the defendant's anger and emotion were enough to
disturb the defendant's ability to reason."' 45 The Fourth Circuit agreed with the
state courts' determinations that the evidence demonstrated significant premedi-
tation and deliberation and did not support any claim that Bates's ability to
reason was disturbed.' As a result, the Fourth Circuit found that the Supreme
35. Bates, 308 F.3d at 418; Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611 (1982) (concluding that due
process only requires a jury instruction on a lesser included offense if the evidence warrants such
an instruction); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980) (holding that the death penalty may
not be imposed if the evidence supported a verdict of guilt of a lesser included offense and the
court failed to allow the jury to consider such a verdict). The Fourth Circuit further defined the
trial court's duty to give an instruction on a lesser included offense through a series of circuit court
decisions. Bates, 308 F.3d at 418.
36. Bates, 308 F.3d at 418.
37. Id. at 419.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 418 (quoting United States v. Chapman, 615 F.2d 1294, 1298 (10th Cir. 1980)).
40. Id. at 418-19.
41. Id. (citing State v. Fisher, 350 S.E.2d 334, 338 (N.C. 1986)).
42. Bates, 308 F.3d at 419.
43. Id. at 419-20.
44. Id. at 419.
45. Id. (quoting State v. Perry, 450 S.E.2d 471, 474 (N.C. 1994)).
46. Id. at 419-20.
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Court of North Carolina did not unreasonably apply Hopper and Beck to Bates's
case." The North Carolina courts' application of Hopper and Beck, therefore, did
not amount to a "fundamental miscarriage of justice."48
B. Prosectution's Cosing Arguments
1. Fifth Amendment Rights
In his closing argument at the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor pointed
out occasions when witnesses had cried on the stand.49 He then asked whether
the jurors had ever witnessed Bates crying.'0 Bates contended that this question
implied that Bates should have testified and thus violated his Fifth Amendment
right to remain silent.51
Bates argued that under Lesko v. LehmanW2 the prosecutor's remarks violated
his right to remain silent 3 The court disagreed, stating that in Lesko the prosecu-
tor pointed to the defendant's failure to make a particular statement, whereas the
prosecutor in Bates's case referenced Bates's overall demeanor during trial.54 The
court found that the prosecutor never directly or indirectly referenced Bates's
decision not to testify; his comments only referred to Bates's lack of remorse and
to his demeanor during trial. 5 As a result, his comments did not violate Bates's
Fifth Amendment right not to testify. 6
2. Prosecutor's Rhetoric
During Bates's sentencing hearing, the prosecutor commented that Bates
had been given the benefit of a trial and of two good lawyers.57 Bates contended
that these comments deprived him of a fair trial.5" He also alleged that his
defense counsel was discredited by the prosecutor, which created prejudice
47. Id. at 420; see Hopper, 456 U.S. at 611; Beck, 447 U.S. at 637-38.
48. See Bates, 308 F.3d at 418-20.
49. Id. at 420.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 925 F.2d 1527 (3d Cir. 1991).
53. Bates, 308 F.3d at 421; see Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1544-45 (3d Cir. 1991)
(concluding that the prosecutor's comments about the defendant's failure to apologize for his crime
while on the stand violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
54. Bates, 308 F.3d at 421; Lesko, 925 F.2d at 1544-45.
55. Bates, 308 F.3d at 421-22.
56. Id. at 422; see Howard v. Moore, 131 F.3d 399, 421 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that the
prosecutor's comments regarding the defendant's lack of remorse did not violate the defendant's
Fifth Amendment rights); Gaskins v. McKellar, 916 F.2d 941,951 (4th Cir. 1990) (concluding that
the prosecutor's reference to the defendant's lack of remorse did not constitute an "improper
comment" on the defendant's refusal to testify).
57. Bates, 308 F.3d at 416.
58. Id. at 422.
2003]
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against him." The court stated that " 'the nature of the comments, the nature
and quantum of the evidence before the jury, the arguments of opposing counsel,
the judge's charge, and whether the errors were isolated or repeated'" should be
considered when determining if a denial of due process has occurred.6 °
The court found that the prosecutor's comments were based upon facts
brought forward during trial or upon facts obvious to the jurors.61 The state-
ments were found not to be pervasive and the judge instructed the jurors to
consider the evidence and not base their decision on either counsel's argu-
ments.62 In addition, the court noted that regardless of whether the comments
were improper, Bates did not object to them at the time. 3 The court concluded
that Bates was not denied due process.'
IV. Application in Virginia
The Fourth Circuit's denial of Bates's petition for a writ of habeas corpus
illustrates a critical aspect of trial advocacy in capital defense. Attorneys must
notice and object to an error at the time that it occurs.65 Counsel cannot defer
his objection until the completion of the opening statement or closing argument.
The court did not hesitate to reject Bates's claim that the prosecutor's closing
argument at the penalty phase violated his Fifth Amendment and due process
rights. The court considered Bates's argument on its merits but noted that it
could not "ignore the fact that Bates at no time objected." '66
In its analysis of Bates's claim that the North Carolina court unreasonably
applied relevant federal precedent under § 2254, the Fourth Circuit first set forth
the applicable Supreme Court precedent. 7 The Fourth Circuit further defined
a reasonable application of this precedent through circuit court decisions.6"
Analytically, if the court of appeals can further define a reasonable application
through the decisions of the circuit courts, then it is equally open to the defen-
59. Id.
60. Id. (quoting Boyd v. French, 147 F.3d 319, 329 (4th Cir. 1998)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 423.
63. Bates, 308 F.3d at 423.
64. Id. at 422.
65. See Mack v. Commonwealth, 454 S.E.2d 750, 752 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that
defendant was barred procedurally from appealing Commonwealth's argument because he did not
object at trial); Russo v. Commonwealth, 148 S.E.2d 820,824-25 (Va. 1966) (holding that objection
made at conclusion of Commonwealth's opening statement waived the objection to the improper
statement made in opening); see also Ashley Flynn, ProceduralDefault: A De Facto Exception to Civility?,
12 CAP. DEF. J. 289 (2000) (explaining how an attorney's civility can lead to procedural default);
Matthew K. Mahoney, Bridging the Procedural Default Chasm, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 305 (2000) (providing
a guide to the fundamentals of preserving issues for appellate and habeas review).
66. Bates, 308 F.3d at 423.
67. Id. at 417-23.
68. Id.
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dant to use circuit court decisions to define an unreasonable application. If
authority from other circuits supports a defendant's claim that the state court
unreasonably applied federal law, counsel should consider using these decisions
for support.
Kristen F. Grunewald

